MCADDF

[IMPACT-DENIAL-001]: Denial of Service via Azure DDoS

1. METADATA HEADER

Metadata

| Attribute | Details | |—|—| | Technique ID | IMPACT-DENIAL-001 | | Technique Name | Denial of Service via Azure DDoS | | MITRE ATT&CK v18.1 | Network Denial of Service (T1498) – https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/ | | Tactic | Impact | | Platforms | Internet-facing services hosted on Azure public IPs (VMs, Load Balancers, App Gateways, AKS, Web Apps) | | Environment | Entra ID / Azure (IaaS & PaaS) | | Severity | Critical for externally facing production services | | CVE | N/A (volumetric and protocol abuse; may be combined with other vulnerabilities) | | Technique Status | ACTIVE | | Last Verified | 2026-01-10 | | Affected Versions | All Azure regions and public IP–based services (with or without Azure DDoS Protection) | | Patched In | N/A – Azure DDoS Protection provides mitigation but cannot prevent all forms of DoS; configuration and architecture determine resilience.[3][10][16] | | Author | SERVTEPArtur Pchelnikau |


2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Operational Risk

Compliance Mappings

Framework Control / ID Description (Failure Mode)
CIS Azure Foundations CIS AZURE 7.x Missing DDoS protection and inadequate monitoring of public endpoints.
DISA STIG Network & boundary STIGs Lack of boundary protection and traffic filtering for mission systems.
CISA SCuBA Network & Logging Insufficient telemetry from cloud edge services (WAF, gateways, DDoS).
NIST SP 800‑53 Rev.5 SC-5, SC-7, CP-10, CA-7 Inadequate denial-of-service protection, boundary defense, and continuity planning.[9]
GDPR Art. 32 Failure to ensure availability and resilience of systems processing personal data.
DORA Art. 11 Insufficient ICT resilience for critical financial services exposed to the internet.
NIS2 Art. 21 Missing technical measures to prevent and respond to large‑scale network incidents.
ISO 27001:2022 A.8.16, A.5.29 Poor capacity management and lack of monitoring of network security.
ISO 27005 Risk Scenario: “Public digital service unavailable due to DDoS” High‑impact operational risk for online channels.

3. TECHNICAL PREREQUISITES


4. ENVIRONMENTAL RECONNAISSANCE

Identify Public IPs and DDoS Protection Status

az network public-ip list -o table
az network vnet list -o table
# Check which VNets have DDoS Protection plans associated

What to Look For:

Baseline Normal Traffic & Metrics

Use Azure Monitor metrics (e.g., IngressBytes, SNATConnectionCount) and Application Gateway/Front Door metrics to understand normal load.[10][16]


5. DETAILED EXECUTION METHODS AND THEIRS STEPS

This section focuses on impact and detection rather than providing attacker runbooks (which would largely be external to Azure). The key is understanding how DDoS manifests in Azure telemetry.

METHOD 1 – Volumetric Flood Against Azure Public IP

Scenario: Botnet sends high-volume TCP/UDP/SYN traffic to a public IP of an Azure Load Balancer fronting a web app.

Observable Effects (Defender view):

METHOD 2 – Application-Layer Flood via Azure Application Gateway / WAF

Scenario: Large numbers of HTTP(S) requests per second from one or many IPs to an App Gateway or Front Door endpoint.

Observable Effects:


6. ATTACK SIMULATION & VERIFICATION (Atomic Red Team)

Atomic Red Team does not currently provide full-scale cloud DDoS simulations due to ethical and legal constraints. However, T1498 is covered conceptually, and small‑scale traffic generation against lab environments can be used to validate detection logic.

Reference: MITRE ATT&CK T1498 – https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/


7. TOOLS & COMMANDS REFERENCE


8. SPLUNK DETECTION RULES

Rule 1: High Request Volume per IP (Application Logs)

Adaptation of typical Sentinel KQL into SPL for web/application logs:[5][8]

index=azure sourcetype="azure:diagnostics" 
| stats count as RequestCount by ClientIP_s, bin(_time, 1m)
| where RequestCount > 1000
| sort - RequestCount

What This Detects:


9. MICROSOFT SENTINEL DETECTION

Query 1: DDoS Protection Metrics – Under Attack

When DDoS Protection Standard is enabled, metrics are available via Azure Monitor and can be ingested into Sentinel.[7][10][13][16]

AzureDiagnostics
| where Category == "DDoSProtectionNotifications"
| where OperationName == "DDoSAttackStarted"

Query 2: Application Gateway / WAF Surge from Single IP

AzureDiagnostics
| where ResourceType == "APPLICATIONGATEWAYS" and OperationName == "ApplicationGatewayAccessLog"
| summarize RequestCount = count() by ClientIP_s, bin(TimeGenerated, 1m)
| where RequestCount > 1000
| order by RequestCount desc

10. WINDOWS EVENT LOG MONITORING

Not primary for this cloud-centric technique; most evidence is in Azure edge and network telemetry rather than guest OS logs.


11. SYSMON DETECTION PATTERNS

Not applicable – DDoS impact is on service availability at the network edge rather than process-level behavior on endpoints.


12. MICROSOFT DEFENDER FOR CLOUD

Defender for Cloud integrates with Azure DDoS Protection and surface security recommendations and alerts about network protections, but DDoS Protection itself is the main engine for detection/mitigation.[4][16]

Ensure that:


13. MICROSOFT PURVIEW (UNIFIED AUDIT LOG)

Not directly applicable for network-layer DoS. However, if the DoS is used as a diversion for account takeover in M365, Purview logs should be correlated for suspicious logins and changes during attack windows.


14. DEFENSIVE MITIGATIONS

Priority 1: CRITICAL

Priority 2: HIGH

Access Control & Architecture


15. DETECTION & INCIDENT RESPONSE

Indicators of Attack

Response Procedures

  1. Confirm DDoS via Azure Portal (DDoS Protection blade, metrics) and Sentinel dashboards.
  2. Engage Microsoft support and, if required, upstream ISPs/CDN providers.
  3. Activate incident communication plans and status pages to inform users.
  4. If attack appears targeted (e.g., specific source countries, protocols), update WAF rules and firewall ACLs accordingly.

Step Phase Technique Description
1 Initial Access N/A (external attack) Adversary identifies public endpoints and capacity.
2 Current Step [IMPACT-DENIAL-001] Denial of Service via Azure DDoS Botnet or reflection attacks overwhelm Azure-hosted services.
3 Follow-on T1190, T1078 DoS used as distraction while exploiting other weaknesses or compromising accounts.

17. REAL-WORLD EXAMPLES

Example 1: DDoS Campaigns Against Cloud-Hosted Services

MITRE and multiple vendors highlight T1498 as a common technique where adversaries use botnets and reflection amplification to disrupt online services, including those hosted in major clouds.[3][6][9][15] Azure DDoS Protection documentation notes support for mitigating volumetric attacks (TCP SYN, UDP floods, amplification) against Azure public IPs.[4][10][16]

Example 2: Killnet and Politically Motivated DDoS

Recent analyses of Killnet campaigns show large-scale DDoS attacks against government and financial services hosted in public clouds. Detection and mitigation guidance for Azure environments emphasize the use of DDoS Protection, Application Gateway WAF, and Sentinel analytics to detect spikes and geo-anomalies in traffic.[17][14]