| Attribute | Details | |—|—| | Technique ID | IMPACT-DENIAL-001 | | Technique Name | Denial of Service via Azure DDoS | | MITRE ATT&CK v18.1 | Network Denial of Service (T1498) – https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/ | | Tactic | Impact | | Platforms | Internet-facing services hosted on Azure public IPs (VMs, Load Balancers, App Gateways, AKS, Web Apps) | | Environment | Entra ID / Azure (IaaS & PaaS) | | Severity | Critical for externally facing production services | | CVE | N/A (volumetric and protocol abuse; may be combined with other vulnerabilities) | | Technique Status | ACTIVE | | Last Verified | 2026-01-10 | | Affected Versions | All Azure regions and public IP–based services (with or without Azure DDoS Protection) | | Patched In | N/A – Azure DDoS Protection provides mitigation but cannot prevent all forms of DoS; configuration and architecture determine resilience.[3][10][16] | | Author | SERVTEP – Artur Pchelnikau |
| Framework | Control / ID | Description (Failure Mode) |
|---|---|---|
| CIS Azure Foundations | CIS AZURE 7.x | Missing DDoS protection and inadequate monitoring of public endpoints. |
| DISA STIG | Network & boundary STIGs | Lack of boundary protection and traffic filtering for mission systems. |
| CISA SCuBA | Network & Logging | Insufficient telemetry from cloud edge services (WAF, gateways, DDoS). |
| NIST SP 800‑53 Rev.5 | SC-5, SC-7, CP-10, CA-7 | Inadequate denial-of-service protection, boundary defense, and continuity planning.[9] |
| GDPR | Art. 32 | Failure to ensure availability and resilience of systems processing personal data. |
| DORA | Art. 11 | Insufficient ICT resilience for critical financial services exposed to the internet. |
| NIS2 | Art. 21 | Missing technical measures to prevent and respond to large‑scale network incidents. |
| ISO 27001:2022 | A.8.16, A.5.29 | Poor capacity management and lack of monitoring of network security. |
| ISO 27005 | Risk Scenario: “Public digital service unavailable due to DDoS” | High‑impact operational risk for online channels. |
az network public-ip list -o table
az network vnet list -o table
# Check which VNets have DDoS Protection plans associated
What to Look For:
Use Azure Monitor metrics (e.g., IngressBytes, SNATConnectionCount) and Application Gateway/Front Door metrics to understand normal load.[10][16]
This section focuses on impact and detection rather than providing attacker runbooks (which would largely be external to Azure). The key is understanding how DDoS manifests in Azure telemetry.
Scenario: Botnet sends high-volume TCP/UDP/SYN traffic to a public IP of an Azure Load Balancer fronting a web app.
Observable Effects (Defender view):
UnderDDoSAttack, AttackTraffic, DroppedPackets).[4][7][10][16]Scenario: Large numbers of HTTP(S) requests per second from one or many IPs to an App Gateway or Front Door endpoint.
Observable Effects:
TotalRequests, FailedRequests, and WAFBlockedRequests metrics.Atomic Red Team does not currently provide full-scale cloud DDoS simulations due to ethical and legal constraints. However, T1498 is covered conceptually, and small‑scale traffic generation against lab environments can be used to validate detection logic.
Reference: MITRE ATT&CK T1498 – https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/
Adaptation of typical Sentinel KQL into SPL for web/application logs:[5][8]
index=azure sourcetype="azure:diagnostics"
| stats count as RequestCount by ClientIP_s, bin(_time, 1m)
| where RequestCount > 1000
| sort - RequestCount
What This Detects:
When DDoS Protection Standard is enabled, metrics are available via Azure Monitor and can be ingested into Sentinel.[7][10][13][16]
AzureDiagnostics
| where Category == "DDoSProtectionNotifications"
| where OperationName == "DDoSAttackStarted"
AzureDiagnostics
| where ResourceType == "APPLICATIONGATEWAYS" and OperationName == "ApplicationGatewayAccessLog"
| summarize RequestCount = count() by ClientIP_s, bin(TimeGenerated, 1m)
| where RequestCount > 1000
| order by RequestCount desc
Not primary for this cloud-centric technique; most evidence is in Azure edge and network telemetry rather than guest OS logs.
Not applicable – DDoS impact is on service availability at the network edge rather than process-level behavior on endpoints.
Defender for Cloud integrates with Azure DDoS Protection and surface security recommendations and alerts about network protections, but DDoS Protection itself is the main engine for detection/mitigation.[4][16]
Ensure that:
Not directly applicable for network-layer DoS. However, if the DoS is used as a diversion for account takeover in M365, Purview logs should be correlated for suspicious logins and changes during attack windows.
DDoSAttackStarted, DDoSAttackMitigated).[10][13]| Step | Phase | Technique | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Initial Access | N/A (external attack) | Adversary identifies public endpoints and capacity. |
| 2 | Current Step | [IMPACT-DENIAL-001] Denial of Service via Azure DDoS | Botnet or reflection attacks overwhelm Azure-hosted services. |
| 3 | Follow-on | T1190, T1078 | DoS used as distraction while exploiting other weaknesses or compromising accounts. |
MITRE and multiple vendors highlight T1498 as a common technique where adversaries use botnets and reflection amplification to disrupt online services, including those hosted in major clouds.[3][6][9][15] Azure DDoS Protection documentation notes support for mitigating volumetric attacks (TCP SYN, UDP floods, amplification) against Azure public IPs.[4][10][16]
Recent analyses of Killnet campaigns show large-scale DDoS attacks against government and financial services hosted in public clouds. Detection and mitigation guidance for Azure environments emphasize the use of DDoS Protection, Application Gateway WAF, and Sentinel analytics to detect spikes and geo-anomalies in traffic.[17][14]